

23 January 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Composition of the Intelligence Advisory Committee

1. The genesis of the Intelligence Advisory Committee was a recommendation of the so-called Lovett Committee, dated 3 November 1945, that a Central Intelligence Agency should be established and that there should be created within the Agency an Intelligence Board which would consist of the G-2, A-2, the Director of Naval Intelligence, and the chiefs of principal civilian intelligence agencies having functions related to the national security. However, in the President's directive of 22 January 1946, which created the Central Intelligence Group, paragraph 7 provided that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be advised by an Intelligence Advisory Board consisting of the heads of the principal military and civilian intelligence agencies of the Government having functions related to the national security. Here for the first time the distinction was made between the Director in his capacity as head of the Agency and as Director of Central Intelligence with responsibilities wider than the Agency head. The Intelligence Advisory Board was to advise him in this latter capacity.

2. The National Security Act of 1947 was silent as to any advisory body, but there is no indication that this omission had significance one way or another. The then Director proposed to reconstitute the Advisory Group by his own appointment action, but met with adamant resistance from the intelligence chiefs who insisted that such a Group would have to be constituted by the National Security Council. This was agreed to and the Intelligence Advisory Committee was established by NSCID #1 to advise the Director of Central Intelligence.

3. No indication has been found in the records that any consideration was given at that time or later to the thought that one representative from the Department of Defense might represent all the military entities involved. In part the military representation on the Intelligence Advisory Committee was a practical recognition of the need for close coordination with each service intelligence group and for close mutual support. However, it also arose in part out of the second proviso of Section 102(d)(3) of the National

Security Act, which read that the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence. This was a clear-cut expression of congressional intent that the integrity of the departmental intelligence agencies should be preserved. If now the Secretary of Defense wishes to unify the departmental intelligence agencies or at least their representation on the Intelligence Advisory Committee, the above proviso would raise a question as to whether he were violating the intent of the Congress. Any objection based on this proviso would be purely technical and would not withstand a determination made in the interest of intradepartmental efficiency.

4. A more difficult question is presented if the Central Intelligence Agency were to adopt the position that unified representation would be detrimental to the functioning of the Intelligence Advisory Committee and to the coordination of intelligence activities relating to the national security. Under sections 102(d)(1) and 102(d)(2) of the National Security Act, this Agency has a duty to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning the intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies and to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities. If, therefore, the Agency believed that possible action by the Secretary of Defense would be detrimental it would have a duty to advise the National Security Council and recommend against such unification. Even if the Agency believed that the unified representation would be beneficial, it would be necessary to recommend to the National Security Council an appropriate amendment to NSCIB #1.

5. If the service representatives on the Intelligence Advisory Committee are replaced by a single representative from the Department of Defense or in the alternative if the Department of Defense representative is added to the service representation, there would be no change, in our opinion, in the responsibilities and authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence or in his relation to the Intelligence Advisory Committee. There is no question in our mind that Congress holds the Director alone responsible for results in the field of intelligence related to the national security. Neither he nor the National Security Council can spread this responsibility or establish collective responsibility in any group or committee. It was for this reason that the Intelligence Advisory Committee was properly set up to advise the Director. This limitation on the Committee's power has not been universally accepted and repeated attempts have been made to establish that the Director is merely one among equals in any matter coming before the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Whenever the issue has been clearly joined on this point, however, pre-eminence of the Director has been specifically recognized. The word "pre-eminence" is carefully chosen in describing relation of the Director to the other members of the

Intelligence Advisory Committee; it is in no sense a command relation.

6. The normal concept of authority consistent with responsibility cannot be applied here in simple form. One Director believed clarification necessary to the point of obtaining authority from the National Intelligence Authority to have him act as their Executive Agent in all matters relating to intelligence. He never exercised this authority, and his successor deemed it advisable to establish the relation more nearly in its present form. This is one of leadership, with certain tools of leadership available such as his attendance at the National Security Council, his position as spokesman for intelligence and certain other recognized attributes of the position. The Director has a right to request more than simple cooperation, although this is the basis of successful functioning, and in the final analysis can place any issue before the National Security Council even in face of the unanimous opposition of the entire Intelligence Advisory Committee, whether constituted in its present form or with the unified representation of the Department of Defense.

151

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